In an follow up to this post, we learn more about Gen Chavalit from the Bangkok Post (where are thou The Nation? UPDATE- finally, something from The Nation):
Gen Chavalit Yongchaiyudh will today visit Privy Council president Prem Tinsulanonda in a bid to end his rift with the Council for National Security (CNS), amid speculation that his close aide will be in the new cabinet line-up, said a military source yesterday. According to the source, Gen Chavalit had agreed to end the spat out of respect for Gen Prem.
COMMENT: Out of respect to Prem? Or because Chavalit has finally got what he wanted, a Cabinet position.
(UPDATE: It has been confirmed that Chavalit met Prem today. What will Gen Saprang think about this?)
The article continues and explains the background to the dispute.
Gen Chavalit upset the CNS members when he criticised the generals for accepting top executive posts on the boards of state enterprises after the Sept 19 coup. He also suggested that ousted prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra be allowed to return to Thailand.
His men were reportedly behind land encroachment allegations against Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont.
The rift deepened when the former prime minister was put on a list of people to be questioned following the multiple explosions at New Year.
The source said Gen Chavalit was not happy that the CNS had put him under surveillance and tapped his phones out of fear he might help Mr Thaksin return to Thailand.
Gen Chavalit and CNS deputy secretary-general Gen Saprang Kalayanamitr recently traded barbs via the media and refused to talk to each other to clear the air. However, CNS chief Gen Sonthi Boonyaratkalin said he did not think the reported rift between the CNS and Gen Chavalit would spin out of control.
Now for the real details:
Gen Chavalit's planned visit to Gen Prem was described as a traditional New Year courtesy call, but it has added weight to speculation that Gen Wichit Yathip, a former deputy army chief, has been offered a seat in a new cabinet line-up expected to be announced soon.
COMMENT: Just a few days ago Gen. Chavalit was a Thaksin lackey, would be the new head of TRT, had allegedly been paid 1.5 billion baht by Thaksin to stir up unrest, and was said to have been behind the 31 December bombs. Now, if this news report is true and Gen. Wichit will get a cabinet seat I wonder whether the investigation into the bombings will now suddenly exclude Chavalit - particularly given Prem believes in Chavalit. Will all those rumours about Chavalit and his Thaksin links suddenly disappear?
Asia Sentinel recently had an article looking at a political comeback for Chavalit:
“The groups that want Surayud out may just be spreading coup rumors to increase the pressure so much that he just resigns,” said a Western diplomat who follows politics closely. “If that happens, it would be hard to find a replacement. If they get really desperate to find somebody, then these guys like Chavalit and [traditional politician] Banharn [Silpa-archa] may bizarrely come back on the scene.”
It’s hard to imagine that the coup leaders would trust Chavalit to take over the civilian government, but there is typically a fine line between friends and enemies here. For sure, Chavalit has taunted the coup leaders. He accused Saprang of “gross incompetence” for not making arrests on the bombings after claiming to know who did it.
Chavalit, though, is a consummate survivor. He remains close to retired general Prem Tinsulanonda, who heads the privy council and is widely seen as the mastermind of the coup. In desperate times, desperate measures may be called for. Chavalit also served in Thaksin first government as Deputy Prime Minister.
COMMENT: I don't think the CNS would ever replace Surayud with Chavalit, but I will examine "how safe" Surayud is in another post. I don't even think that Chavalit could be made a Minister, let alone PM, because of his links to the "ancien regime" (ie Thaksin) and the way his government collapsed in 1997. Time does heal all wounds, but Chavalit would be such an easy person to target as PM and his government would be doomed from Day 1. Chavalit works best as a background figure, given his powerful friends and connections, and so to have his proxy (or should I say "nominee") in the Cabinet would be the best he can achieve under a military-led government.
However, the author is correct in saying that Chavalit is a "consummate survivor". I certainly wouldn't write him off as the CNS seemed to do after the 19 September coup - more on this below. They found out the hard way on Chavalit's staying power.
I do think if an aide/proxy/nominee of Chavalit is given a Cabinet position then this might be a sign that Gen. Saprang (I have my doubts whether their relationship is repairable - more because of Gen. Saprang than Chavalit) is less likely to succeed Gen. Sonthi as Army C-in-C this year, but then again the next paragraph in the article suggests a possible counterweight to Chavalit.
Other names which have cropped up in such rumours include that of Squadron-Leader Prasong Soonsiri, a former national security chief in the administrations of Gen Prem Tinsulanonda.
Sqn-Ldr Prasong, now a member of the National Legislative Assembly, yesterday said during a radio programme that he had been approached by one of the CNS core leaders to be a new deputy prime minister.
Gen Surayud, however, said yesterday he had no knowledge of anyone being asked to join his cabinet.
Prime Minister's Office Minister Prasit Kovilaikool also downplayed the possibility of a cabinet reshuffle soon.
COMMENT: Don't you just love how the PM has no idea on what is going on?
Prasong Soonsiri is a well-known Thaksin critic and he was one of the few critics of Thaksin from the very beginning of Thaksin becoming PM (no "miracle realisation of the evils of Thaksin" like Sondhi from The Manager). His dislike of Thaksin stems from when Thaksin replaced him as Foreign Minister in 1994. Maybe Prasong might be rewarded in exchange for stopping his criticism of the government/Surayud, but is just as likely that he will act as a counterweight to criticism by some over Chavalit's proxy being named a Cabinet Minister. Placating opponents is just politics and making sure that you satisfy enough factions to govern - you satisfy them by making them a Minister and so they get a piece of the pie.
Last, but not least, below is something I wrote at the end of November, but I never ended up blogging (the title has remained the same and it shows you how little things have changed). It shows what Chavalit has been up to this year. I have left it mostly unchanged since I last finished writing it on November 28 so it is written in that time context. It is unfinished, but I don't have the time to finish it now.
General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh provides a perfect example of power in Thai society. The former Army Commander-in-Chief, Deputy Prime Minister (in 3 different governments), Defence Minister, Interior Minister, and Prime Minister.
Prior to the coup, Chavalit had been Minister in the Thaksin government, but have feel out of favour with Thaksin and returned to Prem's camp as Asia Sentinel reports:
Many are also keeping an eye on former Army Commander Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, who served as prime minister during the Asian Financial Crisis. He also served as Thaksin's defense minister in 2001, but since left the government and switched over to the royalist side.
Chavalit appeared with Sonthi and newly appointed Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont when Prem gave his speech imploring army cadets not to be loyal to the government. He has also joined the junta as an adviser, which may still allow him to run as a politician in a year after a new Constitution is written and elections are held.
"Chavalit has very quietly switched sides," an Asean diplomat told the Sentinel. "He's sitting pretty right now."
Chavalit had also been a target, along with Prem, of a leaflet smear campaign just weeks before the coup - note also who is close to Chavalit in this article.
NOTE: Prem and Chavalit go way back, it was Prem who appointed Chavalit Army Commander-in-Chief in the 1980s.
This brings us to Chavalit's role in the coup. The Bangkok Post reports:
Lt-Gen Pirat Sawamiwat, a close aide to Gen Chavalit, said he could not say if Gen Chavalit had a role in the coup, but Gen Sonthi had called on Gen Chavalit at his Pinprapakom residence before Sept 19. After that, Gen Sonthi called on Gen Prem before going ahead with the coup, said Lt-Gen Pirat
COMMENT: Well, I think we can read through the lines here.
The last few days has shown Chavalit flex his muscles. On the weekend, Chavalit attacked the coup leaders as The Nation reports:
Over the weekend, Gen Chavalit called on the CNS to allow exiled former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra back to Thailand and criticised the military council for having appointed too many Armed Forces generals to executive boards of major state enterprises.
His warning on possible adverse consequence of the state enterprise board appointments touched off wild speculation on a possible new coup against the CNS and thus provoked stern responses from leaders of the military council.
Then, suddenly a day or so later Chavalit is hosting (read everything in this link for more on what Chavalit has been up to) a dinner party for the CNS. This just shows his influence and staying power. Thaksin already learnt his lesson from sidelining Chavalit - if Thaksin and Chavalit had been on close terms on 19 September, the coup would have been much more difficult to stage.
Yup, all very typical of network-managed politics and its vicious cycle of shady backroom deals, backstabbing, realignments and more deals. I always enjoy watching a good game modern disciples of Machiavelli, but the implications for the country's future do make it a tad disturbing. Such a system might have worked in 1980, but Thai socity is far more complex and its polity much sophisticated today for this to work. It's no longer a question of if but WHEN the shit finally hits the fan. Anyone willing to take bets?
Tettyan: After being told it is indecisive (cue: Twilight Zone music and a picture of Chuan), the government, or more accurately, one of the governments', the CNS is now on the prowl and threatening the media.
It is almost like a coalition government pre-2005, with wheeling and dealing going along.
Given the quickness at which the junta and the government are shooting themselves in the foot and with GDP growth expected to plummet this year, I expect it will be sooner rather than later that the shit hits the fan. I thought the govt. would be able to survive until Sep 19 - one year anniversary, but now unless they buck up their ideas, I don't see them lasting beyond May. Serious changes need to be made soon.
Ditto.
On another note, whenever a newspaper mentions that someone is "loyal" or "close" to a political figure, it sends alarm bells ringing off in my head. For instance, much was made of Bangkok Bank's close relationship with TRT during the Thaksin "regime." But after the coup, we find that the Sophonpanich clan (owners of the bank) supported the new gov't, owing to their "close" relationship with Prem. Before Thaksin, they also bankrolled the old Social Action Party, which Handley says was effectively run by Prem's men after its founder, MR Kukrit, retired from politics. And just to complicate matters, one of scions of that family, Kalaya, is a prominent member of the Democrat Party!
Same goes for Chavalit. As you mentioned, Prem helped make his career by appointing him army commander. But by the time he became PM, McCargo notes that the network had gotten quite wary of him (even going so far to mention suspicions of his republican sympaties!).
Does it just mean that all these reports are just wrong? Not likely. It just reflects the fact that the number of people and groups who really matter in Thai politics are exceeding few, and that "governments" are really just shifting, ad-hoc coalitions of these handful of interests.
Look at the cast of usual suspects who manage to wiggle their way to the table no matter who's nominally in charge - Wissanu, Meechai, Prasong, Pridiyathorn, and now possibly, Chavalit. Is Thailand really so dereft of administrative and political talent that we keep having to turn to the same people? Most of us know perfectly well that's not the case. The more interesting question is whether the network intentionally kept democratic institutions weak in order to enhance their influence, or whether weak institutions is simply a by-product of its ad-hoc interventions. My inclination is that latter, simply b/c the network, far from being a monolithic entity, can be split on a number of issues.
Which brings my rambling to one final point. The Manager's Sondhi talks of uprooting the "Thaksin regime." What is the "Thaksin regime"? Does it included everyone who did business with him? Collaborated with him? Besides himself, hat would pretty much include anyone who mattered in Thai politics (save the Democrat party, but they haven't really mattered for quite some time now), including the network. Surely he wouldn't want to suggest doing away with that, would he?
Well, they've already punished Temasek, screwing every other foreign investor in the process. They've already killed iTV, destroying media independence in the process.
That leaves only one more thing the junta has to do to truly smash the Thaksin legacy: force all stock market investors to pay a capital gains tax immediately upon earning any profits in the stock market.
Then the shit will really hit the fan...
Other than the man himself - and maybe his lawyer - can there be anyone in Thai politics more irritating than this man?Chavalit's antics since the coup have shown no regard or concern for anyone but himself. His comments and "demands for a deep wai" were clearly designed to draw attention and agitation at a time when the nation was already inundated with problems.
As you touched on, it seems the man who lead Thailand down the road to ruin and his shown a faculty for nothing but childish public posturing seems to have negotiated a place for a lackey to his frail ego in the next cabinet.
I liked Tettyan's comments alluding to the new regime recalling the usual suspects back to the bargaining table.