Andrew Walker of New Mandala has a post on "Rethinking Thailand’s Southern Violence", a book edited by Duncan McCargo, which was recently published by the National University of Singapore.
Here is the publisher's description of the book:
Since January 2004, the three Muslim-dominated provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat in the Thai south have been ablaze with political violence. Early incidents such as the bloody storming of the historic Kru-Ze mosque and the deaths of 78 Tak Bai protestors at the hands of the army made global headlines. But most of the subsequent events have gone largely unnoticed despite a terrible catalogue of "daily killings". The Thaksin Shinawatra government's persistent mishandling of the southern violence was a key factor behind the September 2006 military coup d'etat, the biggest political upheaval in Thailand since the early 1990s.
This collection by Thai and international scholars examines the reasons behind the growing unrest in south Thailand from a variety of perspectives. The contributors reject the simplistic mantras of "terrorism experts" and call for more nuanced, subtle and critical readings of history and monuments, the ambiguous role of Thaksin Shinawatra government, alternative theories and explanations for the violence, the salience of political Islam, voices of ordinary people in Pattani and the misleading paradigms of the insecurity industry.
This book will change the way the southern Thailand conflict is understood.
Contributors are: Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Ukrist Pathmanand, Srisompob Jitpiromsri, Duncan McCargo, Panyasak Sobhonvasu, Wattana Sungunnasil, May Tan-Mullins and Michael Connors.
COMMENT: By the list of authors and a skim read of the book, the book is just a rehash of March 2006's Critical Asian Studies edition which I overall found slightly disappointing. My comments below are on the papers/articles in the CAS edition and not the book, but from my skim read of the book I didn't see any substantial changes to the overall message/content. It is also much easier to excerpt (by copying and pasting) journal articles than book excerpts which I would have to type.
First though I find the dislike of "terrorism experts" to be snobbish. It is like the argument used by some that if you are not Thai you can't understand Thailand or Thai politics. It is incredibly dismissive and doesn't address the argument the person is making. Should terrorism experts then also criticise Thai experts stating they don't understand terrorism and shouldn't try to explain the violence? Part of the problem is that some Thai experts can't bring themselves to think of the current violence as terrorism and this is why we need these terrorism experts. More on that below as not all the articles take this view.
A recurring theme in some of the articles was it all Thaksin's fault without exactly explaining how (remember correlative doesn't equal causative). However, before looking at two articles which make this argument, either directly or implicit, I first want to introduce you to some of the counter-arguments made in two of other articles in the edition. I found both of these articles not only excellent, but also refreshing.
The first article is by Dr Srisompob Jitpiromsri and Panyasak Sobhonvasu entitled "Unpacking Thailand's southern conflict: The poverty of structural explanations" Critical Asian Studies 38:1 (2006), p95-117.
Dr Srisompob is a political scientist at Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani. I am a huge fan of Dr Srisompob's articles on southern Thailand and I have excerpted his articles or quoted his newspaper interviews frequently on this blog. For those who believe the government/CIA/Pentagon are behind all the violence, see this excerpt from the above article:
When closely investigated and classified, the 1,217 cases of attacks citizens in 2004 and 2005 [BangkokPundit: actually up until June 2005] comprised three types: 83.4 percent of the attacks (1017 cases) were attributed to militants or insurgent groups, 15.2 percent cases (185 cases) were regarded as criminal or personal conflict cases, 1.4 percent of the attacks were believed to have been carried out by the authorities. Clearly, militant activities in local communities were widespread, and believed to account for the overwhelming majority of the attacks.
The concluding remarks in the article looks at ideology and it it worthwhile to read the full excerpt which I have posted below:
In the face of this evidence, it no longer seems plausible to attribute the violent incidents in the deep South, as Nidhi does, to a spontaneous “peasant rebellion.” There are clear patterns of violence in terms of locations, victims, and tactics of operation. In 2004, violent incidents increased twenty-seven–fold compared with the average rate of similar incidents during the previous decade.
If identity politics — a consciousness of Patani’s glorious ancient kingdom, or the sense of Malay ethnic identity—are the main reasons behind the operations, the question remains: Why has violence surged now, and not earlier?
If the government and the authorities have made a great blunder, business as usual for the Thai authorities, why has this led to the greater intensity and momentum of violence at this time? The violent incidents took place in spite of the fact that the Thaksin government had already deployed about twenty thousand soldiers and police officers in the three affected provinces. The violence in the Thai South contains important psychological elements, reflecting attempts to instill and propagate fear. In this sense, the violence conforms to the classic definition of “terrorism,” differing from other types of criminal actions because of its political aims and motives, and their far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victims or target.
History, though important, does not offer a satisfactory explanation for recent events. Nor do socioeconomic arguments about poverty, or general arguments about the need for the Malay-Muslim minority to be justly treated by the
Thai government. The tragic and appalling events of 28 April and the Tak Bak incident should not obscure the central facts: during the eighteen months from January 2004 through June 2005, most of the violent incidents that took place in the three provinces were not killings of Muslims by agents of the Thai state.
Based on the known death tolls from those two incidents, and the data gathered from the individual attack surveys, perhaps a few more than two hundred Muslims died at the hands of the Thai authorities during this period. Whatever mistakes
the Thaksin government has committed, it cannot be held directly responsible for all of the remaining incidents. Most of these killings fell into two categories: the murders of Buddhists by Muslim militants (the majority of the 388 Buddhist victims), and the murders of fellow Muslims by Muslim militants (the majority of the 282 Muslim victims).
Claims that many of these murders are attributable to personal conflicts or criminal activities are not supported by the individual attack survey evidence. Because most of these political murders were isolated cases, in which typically only one or two people were killed at a time, the collective enormity of these unfolding events has been difficult to grasp.
During the first half of 2005, Muslim victims of political murders began to exceed Buddhist victims. The growth of this Muslim-on-Muslim violence is one of the most important trends in the data. In the eyes of their Muslim assailants, most of these victims may have been seen as “hypocritical” collaborators with the Thai authorities.
More research is still needed on the structural underpinning of Malay-Muslim grievances against the Thai state, on the politics of identity, and a host of other salient background issues. But this research is unlikely to help much in explaining the post–January 2004 upsurge in violence. The most important questions concern the psychology and motivations of those behind these increasingly vicious attacks.
The ideology of the militants is no longer the somewhat romantic and low-key separatism of the past: the latest waves of attacks have had a much more aggressive and ruthless character. It is time to turn to serious studies of the thinking behind the sizeable militant movements currently operating in the three provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. The root causes are no longer the most critical factor: it is the militant movements and their ideological perimeters that really matter.
COMMENT: I couldn't have said better myself. As time permits, I will look at more recent statistics from Dr Srisompob.
The second article which I think is worth reading is by Wattana Sugunnasil entitled "Islam, radicalism, and violence in Southern Thailand: Berjihad di Patani and the 28 April 2004 attacks" Critical Asian Studies 38:1 (2006), pp 119-144.
Wattana Sugunnasil is currently an assistant professor at the Social Science Department, Prince of Songkhla University, Pattani Campus.
Here is the abstract:
The main argument of this article is that the separatist struggle, which was initially based on a Malay national liberation struggle, has taken on undertones of a radical Islamist ideology, and the discourse of the separatist struggle has significantly shifted to that of radical Islamist politics by calling for a jihad against the Thai state, its local agents, and their Muslim allies. This shift is exemplified by a document entitled Berjihad di Patani, which appears to have helped inspire the violent incidents of 28 April 2004. To a large extent, what is happening in southern Thailand follows similar developments elsewhere, both at the regional level and in other parts of the Muslim world. Factors affecting the changing discourse and practice of the separatist politics are both external and internal: [1] the failures of secularist development projects in the past decades,[2] the influence of Islamic radicalism abroad, and [3] the Islamic resurgence and fragmentation of religious establishment at home.
Wattana makes an important point on the progress that Muslims in southern Thailand have made over the years (at 122):
Another related development that would have a significant impact on Muslim politics can also be observed. By the late 1990s, Muslims were holding unprecedentedly senior posts in Thai politics. Wan Muhammad Nor Matha, a prominent Malay-Muslim politician from Yala, served as the president of Parliament from 1996 to 2001, later becoming deputy prime minister, communications minister, and eventually interior minister during the first Thaksin government. Only a few years earlier, the idea of a Muslim as head of Thailand’s local administration and domestic security structures would have been unthinkable. Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, another Muslim from the Upper South, served as foreign minister of Thailand from 1997 to 2001; and during Thaksin’s first term (2001–2005) there were fourteen Muslim members of parliament and several Muslim senators. In the deep South, Muslims dominated provincial legislative assemblies, and several southern municipalities had Muslim mayors. In this milieu of increasing political liberalization and institutionalized democracy, Muslims have been able to voice their political grievances more openly and enjoy a much greater degree of religious freedom. Muslim girls and women may now wear the hijab in government educational institutions and offices, Muslim names may be officially used, Muslim prayer rooms have been created in public places, and Friday prayers may be held on university campuses.
COMMENT: This is why I find newspaper claims that the root causes of the violence is discrimination against Muslims is the reason behind the violence as it fails to take into account the progress that Muslims have made. At the same time as progress has been made, we have seen an increase in the violence. Shouldn't this give pause for concern that it is not just discrimination which is behind the violence? Wattana then goes on to look at the links between Muslim politican's, crimes, and separatism (at 123):
A parliamentary report also proved problematic for local and national Muslim politicians in that it implicitly linked them with the network of illegal activities, including drug trafficking, cross-border smuggling, organized crime, and the activities of “influential groups.” Illegal businesses have thrived with tacit support and help from some senior government officials and even from some elements of separatists. Some violent incidents in the 1990s, including arson and bomb attacks, were believed to have been staged by these groups to either
protect or further their vested interests. This is a region where, as one commentator puts it, “bandits, good and rogue police officers, good and rogue soldiers, corrupt officials and remnants of Muslim separatist groups have long associated
with, robbed and occasionally killed each other.” To make matters worse, Najmuddin Umar—one of the very same constituency MPs mentioned approvingly by Omar — was officially charged with involvement in the insurgency, and accused of being to be one of the “masterminds” behind the recent violence. Another problem was that in the face of growing violence during 2004 and 2005, Muslim politicians remained conspicuously silent, so eroding their political legitimacy and support. This cost them dearly in politics: in the 2005 general election, all but one of the eleven incumbent Muslim MPs who stood for election were voted out of office.
COMMENT: It is not just Muslim politicians, but also many Muslim leaders who have remained silent.
Wattana also discusses the changing nature of the insurgency in the southern border provinces (at 125)- a topic which I have blogged about previously (here and here):
Since the beginning of 2004, the nature of violence in the deep South has drastically changed following the emergence of radical Muslim militants who have espoused the cause of total war with the Buddhist kafirs (infidels or nonbelievers) and brought with them a highly selective interpretation of Islam. This development was most clearly seen in the tragic events of 28 April 2004, which shed some light on the previously overlooked phenomenon of radical Islamist movements in the deep South of Thailand. On that day, a document, written in 2002 in the Malay language’s Yawi script, entitled Berjihad di Patani (The struggle at Patani), was found on the body of one of the militants killed by Thai military forces at Kru-Ze. Although the document apparently originates with the group responsible for the suicide attacks on 28 April, as part of the justification for their actions, its significance arguably extends beyond the light it sheds on this group of Muslim militants. Berjihad di Patani is the only authentic and detailed statement of radical Muslim militant views in the deep South currently available.
Wattana then provides some background information to Berjihad di Patani (126-127):
Berjihad di Patani presents, as then deputy prime minister Won Muhamad Nor put it, a “very well written” radical worldview with a “persuasive power.” Even if the suicide attacks had not been committed by the 28 April groups, Berjihad di Patani would still be invaluable for its insights into a mind-set that has probably existed for some time, and that will not be easily eradicated by any measures available to the Thai state. The document is written in a style difficult for nonspecialist readers to understand, but has a tone of unquestionable authority. This authority is invested with a religious power that is reinforced by countless injunctions taken from the Qur’an. The document apparently had two authors, Ismael Jaffar, alias Ismael Yameena or Poh Su, a Kelantan native, and Abdul Wahub Data, imam of Tarpia Tulwatat Mullaniti Islamic boarding school in Yala. Abdul Wahub confessed to writing it and expressed great regret; Poh Su was arrested by the Malaysian authorities but later released without charge.
Accusing the Thai government of oppressing the Muslim population in the South, the authors of Berjihad di Patani proclaimed a jihad against the Thai government and those who work with and support it. Without explicitly claiming responsibility for the violence, the document nevertheless provides a rationale for it, and for the attacks that were to follow. It urges Muslims to take up the armed struggle to fight for separatism.
...
For the authors, Patani is Dar al-Islam (the land of Islam) and it has been invaded by the Siamese or the central Thai government—the infidel state. Therefore it is legitimate to call a jihad of defense against infidel (nonbeliever) or kafir invaders. Drawing a parallel between present separatist struggles and the religious warfare that raged in the time of the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century C.E., the authors exhort Muslims to wage a jihad and to rise up against the injustices inflicted upon them by the enemies of Allah.
Wattana looks at the concept of jihad and the selective sources used in the document/book (at 130):
Jihad is a defining concept or belief in Islam, a key element in what it means to be a believer and follower of God’s will. Its importance is rooted in the Qu’ran’s command to struggle (the literal meaning of the word jihad) in the path of God and in the example of the Prophet Mohammad and his early companions. While jihad is about much more than martyrdom, martyrs who sacrifice their lives to establish or to defend Islamic ideals also hold a special place in Islam. The Qur’an has many passages that support the notion of martyrdom and that comfort those left behind. In the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the terms jihad and martyrdom have gained remarkable currency. They are used by Muslims around the world to legitimate their causes and motivate their followers, including those who die for their faith or in the defense of Muslim territory in “just” causes in places ranging from Palestine, to Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kashmir, the Philippines, and southern Thailand. To elaborate on this, a brief excursion into the development of Islamic radicalism is necessary. When the authors of Berjihad di Patani and other militants examine contemporary events, they follow common Islamic practice by citing ancient authorities.
Although many non-Muslims would expect believers to refer to the Qur’an and Hadith (Sunnah of the Prophet) for guidance, most would be surprised by the extent to which the ideas of past Muslim theologians, thinkers, and movements still directly impact upon the minds of militants and other Islamic activists and the Muslim world today. Both modern reformers and radical extremists draw, often selectively, on the teachings and examples of early Islamic revivalist thinkers and activist movements to justify their contemporary jihads. Present-day Muslim radicals or militants, including the authors of Berjihad di
Patani, often link their radical jihadist worldviews to famous earlier interpretations of jihad, for example, that of prominent medieval theologian and legal scholar Ibn Taymiyya, or that of another influential modern thinker, Sayyid Qutb.
However, for me what I think the one of the crucial points in the article is on the general radicalisation of Islam worldwide and in Southeast Asia (at 132):
Development of the content and form of Muslim politics in Thailand and elsewhere has been influenced by external events. While Islamic resurgence and militancy were on the rise from the 1970s onwards, attempts to mobilize Muslims all over the world for a jihad in one area of the world such as Palestine or Kashmir were unsuccessful until the 1980s. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a turning point, as it revived the concept of participation in jihad to expel an infidel occupier from a Muslim country as a personal duty for every capable Muslim. The success and experience of mujahidin in Afghanistan in the late 1980s undoubtedly helped popularize the radical meaning and practice of jihad in many Muslim societies.
At a regional level, the radicalization of Islamist politics worldwide had given birth to new, more radical Islamist movements and parties in Southeast Asia: whereas the Muslim opposition politics of the 1960s and 1970s in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines was led mostly by secular-educated leaders, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed the emergence of more radical movements whose networks were increasingly expanded and ideologies and discourses more heavily colored by the ideas and values of religion. Even in countries like Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, where Muslim politics had long been moderate, the 1990s saw efforts by jihadi militants to expand their radical networks. In southern Thailand since the 1990s, the rise of Islamic radicalism has helped revitalize a flagging separatist movement, which also received a much needed boost from veteran Afghan mujahidin.
Wattana then turns to radicalisation of Islam in Southern Thailand (at 134-135):
Militants have also been able to take advantage of the growing religious consciousness within the Muslim community, as the 1980s and 1990s saw a strong Islamic resurgence in Thailand. The primary characteristic of the religious resurgence that swept the Muslim community was not political; rather, it took the form of a growing piety among Muslims who were showing an increasingly strong interest in the ritual demands of their faith and in their religious life. This resurgence can be seen in the growth of mosque attendance, religious education, Muslim radio and television programs, Muslim newspapers and publishing, and a plethora of translated Islamic literature. An upsurge in manifestations of religiosity and religious awareness could also be seen, ranging from private exercise in personal piety and devotion, involving a detailed observance of the prayers, fasting, and personal morality, to public rituals and behaviors, including a marked increase in the number of women donning the hijab, men wearing beards, and in the numbers of Muslims making the haj, or pilgrimage to Mecca. Although the resurgence was for most Muslims a matter of personal religiosity, it nonetheless benefited the radical militants in two important ways: it provided the opportunity for religious symbols and meanings to be increasingly manipulated for political purposes, and simultaneously contributed to the further fragmentation of Muslim religious authority.
Because the resurgence brought Islamic ideas and institutions such as mosques and Islamic schools into public prominence, separatist groups could exploit related political and cultural contestations for the purpose of mobilizing support. While Islamic resurgence is certainly not the same as religious fanaticism, there is a tendency among government officials, academics, and religious leaders to downplay the religiosity of the militants: yet they certainly take their religion seriously, and seek recruits from the ranks of the pious. Some of the militant groups began to work on their ways to recruit new militant members and also in southern Thailand via ustadzes (religious teachers). Although the extent of militant infiltration of the Islamic schooling system is difficult to quantify, evidence seems to indicate that since the mid to late 1990s, an alliance of groups, including former separatists, newly arrived jihadists, and some ustadzes, systematically targeted the education system. The spread of a new radical separatist ideology in the education system, particularly in the private Islamic schools, was far greater than previously suspected. Militant infiltration and recruitment in these schools apparently reflected the activities of numerous politically radical, well-educated ustadzes in their late twenties, thirties, and forties, many of whom had returned from overseas studies in Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, or Arab countries. In the process, the new separatist politics were developing and the political meanings and practice of jihad, as embodied in Berjihad di Patani, were to be understood and subsequently used in their most violent forms. The new militants advocated a sustained and relentless violent struggle against the kafirs, broadly construed. The jihad became a focus of attraction, the solution for the Muslim community’s ills, and even one of the pillars of Islam.
COMMENT: I am continually surprised that it was the rise of Thaksin which has been linked with the violence yet the fact that a radicalisation of Muslims in Thailand is not raised or discounted. If you look at other countries you can see radicalised Islam has led to violence, is this not also possible in Thailand? Surely, this would also help in explaining the violence? I will look at this further in part 2.
Wattana concludes the article by saying (141-142):
Government officials, liberal academics, and moderate Muslim scholars in Thai society tend to assume that political, social and economic causes underpin the current militancy, and that if these causes are properly addressed, the problem will go away. If the roots of the problem are to some extent ideological, however, it would be naive to expect political gestures and other measures for social and economic improvement to change the hearts of radical militants and their supporters. Attempts to deal with the violence in the deep South as if it were divorced from its intellectual, cultural, and religious foundations must be viewed with great caution. Notwithstanding socioeconomic and political development programs, the government’s counter-violence policy and measures must take the religious and ideological aspects of violence into serious consideration and adopt appropriate measures. They must also be based on an in-depth understanding of the religious justifications of radical Islamist militancy and the development of appropriate responses.
In the local Thai press and other media, Muslim militants are most often seen as mindless terrorists or religious fanatics and anti-Buddhist militants, longing for the past. They are almost always evaluated in harshly negative terms with little or no effort made to seriously comprehend the discontents and the thinking and ideological justification that have provided their support. The success of radical militant groups in the recruitment, posting, and ideological maintenance of sleeper members, with few defectors, demonstrates the deep ideological nature of the phenomenon. Like it or not, people do not undertake violent militant actions without compelling reasons. To ignore the inspiration, mindsets, and motivations of the militants, is to put up an insurmountable barrier to understanding them.
COMMENT: I have removed the footnotes for the article, but I just had to include this footnote which comes at the end of the above paragraph:
79 Alas, such a refusal is rather common among peace-building advocates, subscribers to conspiracy theories, and liberal academics and commentators in today’s Thailand.
COMMENT: It says it all really. I'll look at McCargo and Ukrist in part 2.
