The Nation reports:
Thammasat economist Pichit Likhitjitsomboon said people involved in the May uprising but who directly or tacitly supported last year's coup were no longer a force for democracy.
"They are spiritually dead and democratically dead and are now merely following dictators. They're no longer a force for democracy," he told the audience of about 200 people gathered at Thammasat University for the event.
"For the past 14 to 15 years, these people have slowly become part of the right wing establishment…and they are now giving legitimacy to military dictatorship," said Pichit, who is a professed admirer of Thaksin.
The economist said NGOs were upset because, under Thaksin, their rural constituencies disappeared due to his populist polices. They were also very upset when Thaksin called them "poverty traders", he said.
Pichit said the dividing up of the cake of vested interests - with NGOs as one of the beneficiaries - was a natural consequence of the coup.
He named people like Chula-longkorn University sociologist Surichai Wangeaw and activist Gothom Arya, who were appointed by the junta to the National Legislative Assembly, as being "hypocrites" who benefited themselves while citing people's causes.
COMMENT: I have been meaning to post on this topic for a while and started this post months ago. There are a number of intellectuals and activists in Thai society who have been opposed to previous democratic governments (not just Thaksin), but then in the aftermath of the coup were gushing in their love of the coup to overthrow Thaksin. This trahison des clercs, or treason by the intellectuals, is an interesting aspect of the coup. Instead of being concerned about the overthrow of a democratically elected leader, they quickly championed the coup and the military leaders.
Intellectuals can join a government, but if they do they should no longer pretend they are intellectuals. They simply become government functionaries. They can't take on both roles at the same time and try to be independent. This is at the essence of trahison des clercs because once they ally "themselves too closely with government, states, or political parties [they] betray the independence which is essential if they are to contribute to public discussion".*
In the immediate aftermath of the coup, you had academics and students who were demonstrating against anti-coup coup protesters. They wanted the protesters to "not to be opposed to the coup makers...[and] to cancel their plants [sic] to rally against the military rulers." Yes, you read that right, students and academics supporting the overthrow of a democratically elected government and supporting a military junta. I think it is their lack of respect for the democratic process and the elections which were going to be held at the end of last year which I have the most problems with.
You have academic seminars organised at the SOAS with the only participants being those who criticise Thaksin. This was despite Thaksin, the subject of the debate, being in London when the seminar was going on.
You had the academics appointed to a panel to investigate Thaksin. Yet they still appear to keep their academic status and to comment on political matters being quoted as academics.
There is also the anti-Thaksin intellectuals traveling the world to criticise Thaksin, paid for by the CNS, the coup leaders, which is part of the CNS propaganda information campaign - they even wrote a plan up before it was leaked.
The Bangkok Post in an editorial:
It now is clear that the documents, stolen or not, are authentic. They detail a shocking effort to secretly use 12 million baht to buy or rent some of the country's most influential voices in a partisan political campaign manipulated by the military. They claim to have lined up several leading politicians and academics to attack Thai Rak Thai and the Thaksin circle _ not out of conviction that it was best for the country, but for a share of the 12 million baht. One is torn between what is the sadder military claim: That influential voices can be bought, or that they can be bought so cheaply.
...
Academics and the leading opposition parties who were supposedly to be the front men for the military propaganda also have been mostly silent in the wake of accusations that their opinions and influence were for sale, and for a low price at that.
Thirayuth Boonmi supports the government:
On Wednesday came the last straw. Thirayuth Boonmi, arguably the apex of all "Octoberist" democracy fighters in Thailand in the past three decades, expressed confidence in the interim government installed by the military that staged the September 19 coup d'etat.
COMMENT: There are 29 persons from the academic sector, another 13 NGO types, and many other members of the intelligentsia who are members of the junta-appointed parliament.
I am far from the first to criticise academics for their position. Academic Surachat Bamrungsuk on his fellow academics:
He said the Thai middle class and mass media, who professed to be pro-democracy, must think harder about how democratic their support for the September 19 coup was.
"Today, intellectuals, former leftists and the media are supporting the coup. We're turning the clock back to the time when the belief that the military can solve political problem held sway," said Suchart, who warned that the cycle of coups would mostly continue.
"The important question is: do Thai intellectuals want democracy or dictatorship? Those who opposed the military in 1992 are now serving the military."
Suchart said his fellow lecturers were now happy to receive Bt104,000 and serve as members of the National Legislative Assembly.
In a short article for Jurist, Robert Albritton of the University of Mississippi states in his conclusion:
The history of democracy in Thailand has been one of elite-guided democracy. Whether the Bangkok intellectual and social elites will cede political authority to the hinterland remains the major issue for democratic governance, that is, progress toward mass-based democracy. Dominance by Bangkok elites of the press and academic discourse make this course an uphill struggle, and foreign media interpretations almost invariably rely on the very elites whose interest is at stake. In the long run, however, only mass-based democracy can be called true democracy.
Also, Patrick Jory in an op-ed in the Bangkok Post wrote:
The role of intellectuals in the political crisis raises the uncomfortable question: Did their failure to support strongly enough the principle of respecting the result of democratic elections help legitimise the coup and the royalist regime it has put in power?
Did academics, who for so long have portrayed themselves as supporters of the ''people's movement'', betray the very people they professed to represent, who had voted overwhelmingly for Thai Rak Thai on three occasions?
Last month's publication by the academic journal Fa Diew Kan of a compilation entitled, ''The Sept 19 Coup: The Coup for the Democratic System with the King as Head of State'', may provide an answer to these questions.
This is a compilation of interviews, articles, statements, letters and even web postings by some of the most prominent Thai intellectuals, including Nidhi Eoseewong, Sulak Sivaraksa, Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Kasian Tejapira, Thongchai Winichakul, Somsak Jiamthirasakul, and many others.
The positions of intellectuals during the crisis can be broadly divided into three groups.
The first group gave their full support to the anti-Thaksin movement, and particularly to the People's Alliance for Democracy.
They also backed the call for royal intervention to resolve the crisis, through the use of Article 7 of the (now abrogated) 1997 Constitution.
A number of them have continued to publicly support the royalist regime that was installed after the coup.The second group enthusiastically joined the movement to oust Thaksin Shinawatra, but rejected the call for royal intervention.
This is the group that was subject to withering criticism by Thammasat political historian Somsak in a series of widely circulated webboard postings, which are included in Fa Diew Kan's ''The Sept 19 Coup''.
Mr Somsak accuses the academics who took this position of ''opportunism'', since knowingly or not, their support for the anti-Thaksin movement helped pave the way for the overthrow of the Thaksin government.
The third, much smaller group, whose voices were mostly confined to webboard postings, took the position that no matter what one thought of Mr Thaksin, one had to respect his legitimacy based on the fact that he had been elected on three successive occasions by an overwhelming majority of the people.
Sept 19 placed Thailand's intellectuals in a difficult position.
Many of them had a pedigree deriving from the student democracy movements of the 1970s, and played leading roles in the ''people's movements'' of the 1990s.Yet in the crisis of the last year they were unwilling to support the democratically-elected prime minister in the face of a movement that had declared its intention to do everything possible, including using extra-constitutional means, to depose him.
How can one explain their lack of support for the democratically-elected government?
Some believed that Mr Thaksin had abused the political system to the point that its check-and-balance mechanisms could not function.
Others were outraged at alleged human rights abuses, particularly over the government's handling of the war on drugs and the violence in the South.
But there is perhaps another explanation.Underlying these criticisms one can also detect among many academics a deep-seated distrust of liberalism, which explains their discomfort with the
principle of elections, politicians, and their obvious distaste for capitalism and globalisation.Most of these academics had their overseas academic training in the 1970s and 1980s, at a time when social-science departments in the Anglo-American academic world were heavily influenced by a variety of anti-liberal theories: classic Marxism, post-colonialism and Third World nationalism (with a good dose of anti-Americanism) and, more recently, post-modernism.
This was the intellectual culture that many Thai graduate students at that time imbibed while completing their PhDs.
On their return to Thailand, where liberal principles have never been able to firmly establish themselves since the overthrow of absolute monarchy in 1932, the Marxist, post-colonial/nationalist or post-modern critiques of Thai society engaged in by these academics were strangely in line with the conservative political culture that has taken hold since the 1970s, which historian Thongchai refers to as ''royalist nationalism''.
The similarities are striking, and were on display in the academic debate of 2006: a willingness to discount the importance of democratic elections; a loathing for capitalism; an elitist distaste both for elected politicians (especially from the provinces) and businessmen; and perhaps most importantly, a belief in the intellectual's right to ''speak for the people''.
The mantra recited by many of Thailand's intellectuals during the standoff between Mr Thaksin and the forces aligned against him was that ''elections are only one part of democracy'', ''Thaksin had already destroyed democracy'', ''Thaksin lacked morality'', ''the villagers sold their votes'', or ''the villagers are not educated enough''.What is most surprising is that the intellectuals who demonised the elected prime minister week after week throughout the 2006 crisis, have been generally silent on the royalist-military coup of Sept 19.
Some have even accepted positions in the appointed National Legislative Assembly and the Constitution Drafting Committee.
The essays and comments contained in Fa Diew Kan's compilation, ''The Sept 19 Coup'', may thus read as an attempt by academics to justify the positions they took before Sept 19.
It will therefore make essential reading for those wanting to understand why a majority of academics and intellectuals in 2006 refused to support a government elected by the majority of the people of Thailand.
COMMENT: I also disagree with Ajarn Somsak Jeamthirasakul's สองไม่เอา (song mai aow) views, this is where he criticises academics/intellectuals for not liking either Thaksin or the coup. The phrase opportunism in the op-ed though is correct. As I stated in a comment at New Mandala:
I do think there is a problem with the “Song Mai Aow” position and that someone, whether an academic or anyone else, who wishes to oppose a political leader/political policy needs to also think about what the consequence of that is. Instead of hoping for some imaginary perfect political leader to come along and implement policies that they agree with, they need to be realists. Supporting no one is the easy approach. If not Thaksin, then who? This doesn’t mean they should not criticise political leaders when they disagree with their policies, but just acknowledge what the alternatives are .
COMMENT: I think that academics/intellectuals need to state the necessary context. I don't see the criticism an opportunism, but there is a "jump on the background" phenomenon. As soon as everyone else starts to criticise a leader, everyone joins in. Now, this is opportunism. I still there is value in the original critiques of any leader/political movement - yes this includes Pasuk/Baker criticisms of Thaksin.





