The Bangkok Post's military reporter Wassana Nanuam has a new book out on the coup entitled "ลับ ลวง พราง" which The Nation translates as "Secrecy Deception Camouflage" or what the Bangkok Post translates as ''Secrets, Deceptions and Disguise'' - I prefer The Nation's translation. The Bangkok Post (cache):
Former chairman of the Council for National Security Sonthi Boonyaratkalin insists he would not change his mind about staging the Sept 19, 2006 coup to oust then prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra if he could turn back the clock.
''If I hadn't staged the coup, we would not have known what would happen to the country and the institution [of the monarchy]. We could not predict whether the democratic system under the constitutional monarchy would exist,'' he says in a newly-released book called ''Secrets, Deceptions and Disguise''.
''If I could turn back the clock, I would stage the coup like before. The situation forced me to do it,'' he adds.
The book is written by Bangkok Post military beat reporter Wassana Nanuam, who spent over one year collecting information.
Gen Sonthi defended the necessity of the coup, which he said not only prevented violent clashes between supporters and opponents of Mr Thaksin but also protected the monarchy.
He also insisted that Mr Thaksin had not appointed him as army chief and he had no debt of gratitude for the ousted prime minister.
Gen Sonthi felt disappointed with the performance of the coup-appointed premier Surayud Chulanont.
He says only he himself and Gen Anupong Paojinda, then commander of the First Army Region and now army chief, plotted the coup d'etat.
Gen Saprang Kalayanamitr, then commander of the Third Army Region, was not involved in any coup planning, according to the former army leader. He later phoned Gen Saprang to bring troops to Bangkok on Sept 19, 2006.
''Only I and Pok [Gen Anupong's nickname] plotted the coup,'' says Gen Sonthi in the book.
Gen Sonthi insisted Privy Council president Prem Tinsulanonda was not involved in the coup. But he admitted he met Gen Prem at least once a week to brief him about the political situation before staging the coup.
On Prem's role, Wassana in the Bangkok Post on September 21, 2006 (as quoted by Hewison) quoting an army source:
The coup plot was known within a tight circle of people, among them Gen Prem Tinsulanonda, president of the Privy Council, and his close aides at Ban Sisao Theves, Air Force Commander-in-Chief ACM Chalit Pukkasuk and Lt-Gen Anupong Paochinda, commander of the First Army Region.
BP: So what were the more than once a week meetings with Prem about? Did Gen. Sonthi have a weekly meeting with Thaksin to brief him about the situation?
Also, when he says we don't know whether there would have been a democratic constitutional monarchy, his solution was to remove the democratic part. This helped ensure for at least a year there wouldn't be a democracy he was so wanting to protect.
Kom Chad Luek has an article on the book and has more details. I have summarised the part in regards to Gen. Sonthi's comments:
The person whose name is Thaksin Shinawatra is a businessman... administering the country and running a business is similar in certain aspects, but business is about "worldly/external aspects" whereas administering the country is about both external and internal aspects. Also, administering the country consists of the people and the nation
Kom Chad Luek has more on Gen. Saprang's role:
The author on Gen. Saprang's role states that he wasn't involved in the planning aspect of the coup, but he was involved in the public relations campaign to discredit the government and involved with the PAD. He was involved in preparing forces which resulted in those in the Third Army Region to advise Thaksin that the was preparing forces against him 7 months in advance.
BP: It would have been a bit obvious to Thaksin's allies in the military if Gen. Saprang, the Third Army Region Commander who is based in Phitsanulok in the north of Thailand (lower north), was involved in the planning of the coup which took place in Bangkok. More:
The author states that even Armed Forces Preparatory School classmates (Class 6) of Gen. Sonthi were only invited to join the coup group-CDR [precursor to the CNS] after the seizure of power as Gen. Sonthi wanted to keep the coup secret. This made the coup easier to stage as no one knew about it and though it could be staged.
Gen. Sonthi did not involve the other commanders of the armed forces and Gen. Winai [member of CDR and CNS] only became on the final day before the coup. Then Air Force commander-in-chief ACM Chalit Pookpasuk [another CDR and CNS member and was acting Head of CNS when Gen. Sonthi became Deputy PM] was telephoned. Sathiraphan Keyanont, Head of Navy who was in the Sattahip, was telephoned to come to seek an audience with HM the King. Pol. Gen. Kowit, Head of Police, was telephoned, but refused to participate. Gen. Ruengrod, Supreme Commander, was not asked to participate until the next day. He had participated in an attempt to counter the coup with fellow Thaksin classmates from the Armed Forces Preparatory School, Class 10.
The author reported that the coup gathered at Gen' Sonthis's Kesakomon residence to plan the coup between September 16-18. There were 7-8 people involved including Gen. Sonthi, Gen. Anupong [current Army C-in-C] Lt-Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha, who is not Commander of the First Army Region, but was then Deputy, Col Phumphat Chansawang, a commander in Special Warfare Command [who was recently transferred by Gen. Anupong to a less prestigious position] and another Colonel from the Special Warfare Command and a junior office close to Gen. Anupong. Gen. Winai did not become involved until September 18.
BP: So when the Hat Yai bombings were taking place, Gen. Sonthi and co continued with their coup preparations?
The author also confirmed about the opposition to the coup after they received instructions from Thaksin. Supreme Commander Gen. Ruengrod was in control of the situation. Pol. Gen. Chidchai Vanasatidya, Deputy PM and Justice Minister [also Acting PM for a while in 2006]; Prommin Lertsuridej, Secretary-General to Thaksin; and Newin Chidchob gathered together after receiving instructions from Thaksin. They tried to encourage Gen. Ruengrod to persuade Gen. Boonsang, then Deputy Supreme Commander [now current Supreme Commander] to speak with Gen. Sonthi before his audience with HM the King, but Gen. Ruengrod didn't want to fight as they had already lost. He then tried to join Gen. Sonthi and others for the audience with HM the King, but was not in time.
"If I wanted to fight, I don't know who would have won or lost, but it would not have been that difficult for me to win as I had a number of troops at my command especially classmates of Thaksin. What is important is that they were Bangkok soldiers whereas the soldiers from the coup group were from outside of Bangkok. All upcountry soldiers. How can they fight in Bangkok? I didn't want for there bloodshed on the street because those who die would not be the senior officers, but the junior soldiers. We are all soldiers, why should we fight? I conceded, but don't admit defeat" Gen. Ruengrod stated.
BP: I wonder what the Thaksin camp think of Gen. Ruengrod who didn't even seem to offer "much fight" and was so eager to join the coup group that night. If he really had the numbers, he could have made contact with Gen. Sonthi to advise him of this.
NOTE: By "much fight", I don't mean he was willing to cause bloodshed, but that he didn't even appear to negotiate out of the coup. His contact was to join the coup.
In one part of the book, it states there were 9 persons who were behind the coup, but it doesn't say their names. However, their names are revealed, one at a time. General Pallop Pinmanee's role [yes, that Gen. Panlop ], who is the former head of ISOC and was suspected of involvement in the car bomb case admits they helped at the coup group command center on the night of the coup and advised Gen. Sonthi throughout.
"There were many people behind the coup. If their names were disclosed, they would shout, but now is not the right time" Gen. Panlop said.
The author also disclosed the role of Varin, Gen Sonthi's fortune teller, but Gen. Sonthi didn't believe Varin that he should be PM himself. He also predicted the coup would be success.
The author also talks about the aftermath of the coup and the disagreements in the CNS. Over the battle to be Army C-in-C, Gen. Sonthi and Gen. Saprang severely disagreed with Gen. Saprang stating that him and Gen. Sonthi "are in different worlds". Gen. Saprang and Gen. Anupong don't look at/speak to each other anymore
After the election with the old power coming back to power, the various former members of the CNS separated and have been trying to save themselves as they are afraid of revenge. They refer to the need for "reconciliation" or "for the nation"
BP: Reminds me of Prem the other day urging "forgiveness" something which was lacking after the September 19 coup.
Gen. Anupong was the key person in ensuring the coup was a success. They risked their lives together. But now he is in disagreement with Gen. Sonthi as he believes that Gen. Sonthi didn't propose his name to be Army C-in-C. Gen. Anupong is now relying on his friends from Armed Forces Preparatory School, Class 10 to reconcile with Thaksin. Whereas Gen. Sonthi called Thaksin and this caused him a lot of trouble, but it was to get Thaksin and co to trust him. However, Gen. Sonthi is still involved in quiet backroom dealings and Gen. Sonthi is afraid for his own safety and has moved to a different army residence. He might get involved in politics again as Puea Paendin, which he assisted in forming, and which he asked the military to vote for.
BP: Argh! Some more talk of Puea Paendin being the military party. Perhaps, The Nation can do an investigative piece on how Puea Paendin were able to find their election campaign.
I wonder really just much PPP trusts Gen. Anupong.
The author states that Gen. Sonthi is still proud of the coup and that they people accepted it pointing out that people brought good things to solider such as Brand's chicken soup or bird's nest. He also used military strategy which he had been educated about, Mao Tse-Tung, Sun Tzu, and from the CIA and KGB.
The author notes that after coup, the CNS gave out bonuses to various commanders who risked their lives, they received better positions and improve ranks and at least a 1 million baht tip per unit.
BP: This would explain the 1 billion baht slush fund. Again, it just proves that "crime pays".
The author also looks at the role of Gen. Winai, Defence Permanent Secretary, who was the political brains for Gen. Sonthi, and Lt-Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha, Commander of the First Army Region, who is seen as the future Army C-in-C.
Gen. Sonthi is not disappointed with the coup as at least it will not cause the government and leaders to do something that the people cannot accept. Even with the benefit of hindsight, he would still stage the coup, but would review who was PM and perhaps he would take the role himself. He does understand that Surayud is not "superman", but is disappointed that he failed to do anything.
"He didn't give any orders/instructions. He didn't follow ours. We had to accept as we couldn't be like normal coup groups a we didn't want others to look upon us badly as dictators. This caused us not to use all our power" said Gen. Sonthi.
"At first, did the people hate us? No they didn't. Were they happy [with the coup]? Yes, they were. They were happy with everything. We did the right thing. It was the role of the government to administer the country.
When asked whether he made a mistake in choosing the government and PM, he replied "That's a good question (นั่นนะซิ), but you can't say it was a mistake because at first when we chose the people accepted the PM and the government. Did the people hate us? No, they didn't. Were they happy ? Yes, they were. They were happy with everything. We did the right thing. It was the role of the government to administer the country.
But if asking about his expectations of Gen. Surayud, Gen. Sonthi said that it was the same as the people. I don't want to criticise. I don't want to effect our senior-junior relationship, but it is time that I said some things.
I want to say if the government doesn't want to administer the country, but if after it has accepted the task it says it doesn't want it. The country will be like this. If the PM thinks it is troublesome to take on the role of PM then just don't accept it.
Gen. Sonthi also said that after they started administering the country, why don't the people love the government? The people want to love the government. To get the people to love the government, the policy of the army is "Nation, Religion, Monarchy" so the army and the people are at one. To get the people to love the army, the army need to be involved. The government must act so the people love the army. It could have been done. For example, before the December 23 election, the government raised the tollway price, raised the price of good, but during Thaksin's administration, they had a strategy and that was to use a fund in order to get votes.
BP: Oh the irony. The horrible Thaksin populist policies which were an abuse of power to benefit Thaksin are just the policies Gen. Sonthi wanted Surayud to implement.
Gen. Sonthi said in relation to Gen' Surayud that if you take the position "when will it be December 23?". This is not the right thing to do as we have 4 duties. The CNS gave responsibility to the government for just 4 duties. For the government to take control of the independent agencies (ให้รัฐบาลไปกำกับดูแลองค์กรอิสระ ). It is the responsibility of the administers of the country. CNS was just in the shadows.
BP: So how are they independent then?
If I could turn back time, I would carry out things in the same way, but I would be the PM instead or find someone different. At the time, I couldn't think of anyone else, but Gen. Surayud. Thinking about it, it would have been better to be PM myself as I still faced criticism without being PM.
Even though there is a lesson from Gen. Suchinda and the aftermath of Black May as the people might come out to oppose, but Gen. Sonthi is confident that if it was me, it wouldn't have been like that because it was really for the people this time.
BP: I am not sure whether everyone would have believed Gen. Sonthi was the great white knight if he had become PM himself.
The author concluded that the lesson to be learnt from the September 19 coup by CNS is that they didn't use enough power and this caused defeat. If there was another coup, the army would use all its powers and there might be bloodshed. It is not certain that the September 19 coup was the last coup, but it caused the army to be bored of politics and staging a coup as throughout the whole time the army had to be on alert.
Since the December 2007 election the CNS has been defeated even though there were orders to assist the Democrats and Puea Paendin.
BP: So what do the Dems know about this?
The book is causing a bit of a stir. The Nation reports:
Chief royal adviser General Prem Tinsulanonda yesterday dismissed speculation that he was involved in the seizure of power on September 19, 2006.
It is the first time Prem has made a rebuttal in public. He said that as president of the Privy Council, he was obliged to be politically neutral.
He refused to comment on political activities, including the current move to amend the 2007 Constitution.
Meanwhile, Air Force commander-in-chief ACM Chalit Pookpasuk denied giving interviews to Wassana Nanuam, a military-beat reporter for the Bangkok Post and author of the book "Lab Luang Prang" (Secrecy Deception Camouflage), which claims to provide insights into the 2006 coup.
Chalit, former caretaker chairman of the now-defunct Council for National Security, said he did not know where the author had received the information for her book and he had never given her any interviews.
He said he would not read the book.
"I joined the CNS because the situation forced me to. The Air Force must join other armed forces to end political crises. The people who ran the country did something inappropriate,'' he said.
He said he met and talked with former CNS chief General Sonthi Boonyaratglin often, and there was no problem in reaching an understanding with him.
BP: My review of the book will be of different parts of the book over a longish period of time. There is so much material in the book. Most of it has been published in the Post at different times, but it is nice to bring it all together.