UPDATE: Thai Rath quotes Deputy PM Wissanu as stating that at the joint meeting between the NCPO and the Cabinet that had not agreed upon the use of Section 44 to amend the interim Constitution, but instead had decided to use Section 46 of the interim Constitution.

The Nation:

Prayut revealed Tuesday that following the new King’s consideration, the draft would be returned for amendments to be carried out in few points. However, the premier did not elaborate which points would be amended.

The Office of His Majesty’s Principal Private Secretary contacted the government that some legislation on the draft’s second section on the monarch would need to be discussed, Prayut said.

Reuters:

"The request said there are three to four issues that need fixing to ensure his royal powers," Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha told reporters after a weekly cabinet meeting.

…

Prayuth said that the junta and the cabinet agreed to make the requested amendments. The process will take up to three months because the government would first need to make changes to the current interim constitution before it can then change the draft constitution, he said.

COMMENT: How to amend the interim Constitution? Section 46 of the interim Constitution states:

In case of necessity and appropriateness, the Council of Ministers and the National Council for Peace and Order shall have joint resolution to amend this Constitution and propose the draft Constitution Amendment to the National Legislative Assembly for approval.

The National Legislative Assembly shall approve or disapprove the draft Constitution Amendment within fifteen days as from the date of receipt of the draft Constitution Amendment.

The National Legislative Assembly is unable to amend the draft Constitution Amendment, except where the Council of Ministers and the National Council for Peace and Order agree upon.

The approval shall be made by a majority of votes of the existing members of the National Legislative Assembly.

If the National Legislative Assembly approves the draft Constitution Amendment, the Prime Minister shall present the draft Constitution Amendment to the King for His signature within fifteen days as from the date the approval has been given. When His signature has been given, the draft Constitution Amendment shall come into force as the Constitution upon its publication in the Government Gazette. The Prime Minister shall countersign His Royal Command. In this case, section 37 paragraph eight shall apply mutatis mutandis.*1

COMMENT: Per Reuters and others - such as TNA - the Cabinet and the NCPO have agreed upon the amendment appears up to the NLA to proceed with the amendment. However, TNA, Khaosod English specifically refer to Section 44 of the interim Constitution (the all-encompassing power) being used to amend the interim Constitution. but many other publications, including INN, Prachachat, Reuters, The Nation, Thai Post, and ASTV Manager make no mention of Section 44.

In addition, Isra News have the proposed amendment to the draft Constitution and it does not correspond with what a Section 44 order looks like although it does match what a normal amendment (i.e under Section 46) to the interim Constitution would look like. PM Prayut was also quoted as saying in the press conference today that if the draft Constitution was returned, we will amend amend the interim Constitution which, if quick, will take 1 month (his quote says "ตอนนี้ถ้าส่งร่างรัฐธรรมนูญลงมาแล้ว เราจะแก้ไขรัฐธรรมนูญฉบับชั่วคราวฯ ถ้าจะให้เร็วก็ประมาณ 1 เดือน"). Normally, using Section 44 does not take 1 month whereas for the Cabinet and NCPO to notify the NLA, NLA to amend, for royal endorsement, and publication in the Government Gazette then 1 month would sound about right. Even listening to the video (ASTV Manager link above), BP does not hear mention of Section 44. Has anyone seen clarification whether it will be Section 44 or Section 46 used to amend the interim Constitution?

*1 In case, you noticed paragraph 5 is not the same as per the website, it is because paragraph 5 was amended in 2015.

UPDATE: Actually, don't update your RSS feed Use either http://feeds.feedburner.com/BangkokPundit or this link.

Matichon reports than Hun Sen as well as the leaders of Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia will not attend the ASEAN opening ceremony tomorrow morning for a variety of reasons.

BP: It is a little unusual you would have so many leaders missing. This should not be seen as a snub to Thailand as such. From what BP understands attendees (well at least some of them) had been told that there would be no opening ceremony and then suddenly around 1-2 weeks this was changed and an opening ceremony was added. By this time, many had made other plans given the arrangements have been in the pipeline for months. More about bad planning from the Thai side than a snub.

Later this evening this blog is scheduled to move to Asian Correspondent and will be located here

Anyone who visits the old site address, namely:
http://bangkokpundit.blogspot.com/

Will automatically be forwarded to the new address, namely:
http://asiancorrespondent.com/BangkokPundit

So in theory if you don't change your bookmarks and you will still find the new site after a delay of a few seconds. Also, links to old posts should be redirected to the same post which will now be located at Asian Correspondent. The new RSS feed is here.

BP thought long and hard about this change. Initially, actually said "no", but upon reconsideration and new information, decided to say "yes" at the last minute. For a write-up of the new site and the concept, see this blog post here. This is certainly not for everyone as Bangkok Dan explains here.

The most important question will be, how will the move change new content? Simply put, BP doesn't see that there will be any change. BP will write and post as usual. There is no pre-editing and blog posts will go up in similar from to now. The new editor program to draft posts is rather new from the Blogger interface and the site is still in beta so things may not work smoothly for the first week or so, but hopefully the teething problems will be limited.

In fact, in a few months there will likely be more translations. The new blog is a paying gig, albeit not enough to give up the day job. However, money was not the motivation for the move, but the plan with some of the money is to hire a student/intern for some translations so the new move will likely result in more content from the Thai language media. This is still in the planning stage now.

Actually, enjoyed the independence of the old blog, but things had become somewhat static in the sense that there was nothing new. Had been thinking about ways to expand the blog, but is difficult to attract that kind of advertising money as a single blog and well don't have the time to go looking for advertisers. Well that and not having to deal with any technical problems and just being able to write.

NOTE: Don't post any new comments after around lunchtime Thailand time as have no idea what is happening regards comments.

The twitter account and e-mail remain the same.

Have previously blogged on the Chavalit-Prem relationship (Chavalit speaking out here and here; Prem's response), but also thought that Thai Rath had some interesting points in their analysis a few days on the Chavalit-Prem relationship entitled "Just Friends, Not the Son of Uncle Prem" (แค่เพื่อนไม่ใช่ 'ลูกป๋า').

The analysis notes the joining of Class 7 [that is from the military academy and includes Manoon Roopkachorn and Gen. Panlop Pinmanee, Chamlong's classmates] and Class 10 [that is Pre-Cadet Class 10 which is Thaksin's class].

NOTE: See Siam Report's excellent post on Chavalit, Puea Thai and the military here.

The analysis notes that when Prem responded to Chavalit the other day, he referred to him as a "friend" and not as his son [the Thai term ลูกรัก when is difficult to translate, but along the lines of teachers' pet]. This shows that the relationship between Prem and Chavalit is not like it was in the past.

BP: It seems clear now that this is the case, but there is no dislike between Chavalit and Prem like there was between Samak and Prem - actually Prem's sending of an aide to warn Chavalit still suggests there is a relationship there as he certainly wouldn't have done this for enemy. Also, Prem no longer is at the zenith of this powers as he was just after the coup - think of the powerful and mighty backer behind the police chief appointment. About this much, BP is sure of. Still not quite sure why Chavalit spoke as a way he did to draw Prem out like this and what happens now.

Chavalit is always talking about reconciliation - he has even attacked the government once? - and according to PAD leader Suriyasai there will be a meeting between Chavalit, Chamlong, and Sondhi L next week (Chamlong and Chavalit go back a long way and both were prominent in the protests against Suchinda in 1992).

The Nation:

Nation Broadcasting Corp yesterday set its initial public offering price at Bt2.90 per share, saying it was appropriate and not too high considering the firm's expansion plans for new media and cable TV in the future.
...
A brokerage source said NBC's IPO price of Bt2.90 left plenty of room for an upside gain as it was set at a 50-per-cent discount.

NBC's pro forma price-to-earnings ratio is 15-16 times while the media sector in the Market for Alternative Investment is now 18-20 times.

BP: Will you invest?

UPDATE: Another opinion piece, this time from Kao Hun which states that Bloomberg is an influential news organization in the financial sector with many offices and a large number of staff around the world. Thai staffers at Bloomberg stated that the news story should not go ahead, but the foreigner, Richard Frost in Singapore was pushy and was able to get the story out. No need to look for anyone else, it was Bloomberg that pushed down the stock prices.

BP: If you look through Richard Frost's articles you will see he is actually in Hong Kong not in Singapore. Makes you wonder how reliable their "source" is.

As we know last week the stock market fell upon rumors of a deterioration of HM the King's health. Bloomberg were the first to report on the news that the SET was falling on news that HM the King's health had deteriorated. Normally, being first to report on something - other news agencies quickly followed (well there was one big exception), but it has resulted in a barrage of attacks against Bloomberg.

ASTV Manager had an article with a headline on October 15 paraphrasing the SET stating "Evil Bloomberg, first to spread the hellish news (แฉบลูมเบิร์กสุดชั่ว ต้นตอปล่อยข่าวนรก). The article then states that SET executives quickly prepared the emergency situation of shutting down the SET if the market dropped below 10% upon news that hooded bandit had employed Bloomberg to falsely speculate to destroy the institution by having a broker in Singapore to ignite the trouble (ไอ้โม่งจ้างสำนักข่าวบลูมเบิร์กวิเคราะห์มั่วทำลายสถาบัน โดยมีโบรกเกอร์ที่สิงคโปร์จุดชนวน)

BP:  That hooded bandit (ไอ้โม่ง) reference is hilarious.

Naew Na had an editorial on October 19 criticizing Bloomberg for disseminating news about HM the King's health stating it was inappropriate. It also said that it caused the stock market to crash. This caused much damage and the government and authorities should not let this issue be.

It is believed the disseminating of the news is an evil plan of some movements in Thailand (จึงเป็นไปได้ที่จะเป็นแผนการอันชั่วร้ายของขบวนการคนไทยบางกลุ่มที่ใช้ชาว). Foreigners were used as a tool to destroy the high institution [ie the monarchy].This is a most important matter of danger to the high institution and to national security. It is certain the movement won't just stop at this.

BP: Umm, there is a difference between reporting a rumor and reporting an analyst's opinion that rumors are making the SET fall - most people don't even dispute the fact that the rumors were making the SET fall, but simply reporting this as opposed to the rumour is verboten. By their logic they should also not criticize Bloomberg because by doing so they are also reporting on the rumor which they think should not be disseminated. Argh, but they are happy to do that.

If you want to have a idea on how uninformed some are Naew Na had a similar rant in their editorial on October 16 calling Bloomberg a "European news agency" (สำนักข่าวด้านเศรษฐกิจและการเงินฉบับหนึ่งของยุโรปที่ชื่อ บลูมเบิร์). A google search would have alerted them to a Michael Bloomberg and Bloomberg LP, but well who cares about facts!

Thai Post states that one factor which lead to the SET fall was Bloomberg's report

BP: Surely, if Bloomberg and the other areas of the foreign media are somehow responsible for the stock market fall we need to know when the SET started falling and when Bloomberg's first article was released to the public.

A reliable source with access to a Bloomberg terminal points out that Bloomberg's first article on the issue was timestamped 3:38pm on October 14 (note the current time stamp of the web article is the time stamp for the last update).

So for October 14, the SET was as follows:

• 752.22 10:00 a.m. (opening price)
  
• 723.82 3:38 p.m. (Bloomberg's story hits the wires)
• 714.64 4:10 p.m.  (lowest point of day)
• 731.37 4:45 p.m. (closing price)
  

BP: So actually the SET went up after Bloomberg's story hit the wires.

For October 15, have a screenshot from the SET website below:

BP: You will see this drop of 5.3% was after everyone else reported the story and AFTER the Royal Household Bureau released a statement saying that the HM the King's condition was good. 

Foreigners were not even the major sellers, it was local institutions as this screenshot from the SET shows:



BP: BP's view is that the lack of information was concerning to foreigners who were confused as to what was happening. They put a lot of money into the SET this year (as of now 63 Billion Baht) and also during October - see here - whereas locals and local institutions have been the sellers. Now, after the news foreigners are back buying again.

The SET was falling before the Bloomberg report so there is no evidence they were the cause of the SET decline.

BP has blogged on Reporters Without Borders previous report on media freedom in 2007 (it was then 135th in the world). This improved to 124th in 2008, but has now dropped back to 130th in the world. The reason for the decline is lese majeste and associated laws as RSF explains:

As the end of King Bumibol Adulyadej’s reign approaches, the monarchy has become an ever more sensitive issue. At the start of January 2009, the information and communications minister announced that the government was going to invest 500 million baht (1.1 million euros) to put in place a national filtering system to block websites hosted abroad that could damage the monarchy. Since December 2008, the ministry has decided to step up the fight against the crime of lese majeste online. More than 4,000 websites have been blocked since the start of 2009. However, official sources say that only 4,800 pages have been blocked for this reason since March 2008.

BP: It seems that RSF does not believe in the "Abhisit effect". To be honest, BP is a little skeptical that things have got worse compared with last year. Yes, while there are more "threats", but there is significantly more reporting on "sensitive" issues now which is on the edges of the law. Now, we live by code words. There is a greater threat to journalists per se, but to BP the actual level of press freedom has not got worse.

7 years ago, Thailand was 66th, but if reporters were to hypothetically report that a certain person was not so happy with the PM because of a business relationship with their son then those reporters would still have found themselves in trouble. Enforcement was still the same back then (a special report of The Economist was also banned back then too), but nowdays the laws are being challenged more frequently. To BP, this doesn't mean that press freedom has got worse.

As we already know, a few weeks ago the New Politics Party choose a new leader. Sondhi L won. At the time, noted the dramatic shift in colors from yellow to green. While NPP had announced a few months ago a move to green and yellow color, this was the first time that BP noticed had dramatic a shift as it is really green with a few touches of yellow here and there.

Michael Nelson has another guest post at New Mandala with photographs and commentary from the day that Sondhi L was elected as leader. The post is worth reading and the photographs show just how professional it was. The key excerpt for BP is:

According to this booklet, as of 30 September 2009, the NPP had 8,922 members....

The number of party members still seems to be small. However, the party’s action plan envisages reaching 500,000 members and establishing 40 branches within the year 2010. At the end of 2011, every province should have one branch, and there should be 200 district as well as 1,000 tambon centers, serving one million party members. One year later, there should be 600 district centers and 4,000 tambon centers with five million members. Thaksin Shinawatra does not seem to be convinced that this will work. In an interview with the Economist (online, 15 October 2009), he said, “I don’t think there are too many hard-core yellow shirts, if not being supported by Democrats and by military, and the reason they were supported by military is because the so-called elite instructed them.”

The NPP plans many activities to train leaders, change agents, and party functionaries. Obviously, this is an ambitious plan. It will also not come cheap. The budget for 2010 is set at 117.9 million baht, while fund raising activities are supposed to generate 214 million baht, 120 million of which should come from membership fees.

BP: Actually, there are a number of yellow shirts, but most of them are Democrat voters. As Thaksin states, the hard core is rather small - well now at least. NPP's problem is turning yellow shirts, particularly those who watch ASTV and read the Manager into NPP voters. It seems it will be difficult to move beyond this target group and well the focus will likely be on yellow shirts who follow the ASTV media group.

So far the NPP is only picking up Democrats who were clear PADites and even then this is only happening slowly. As already noted, NPP will need an issue. They have been using Preah Vihear to attack the Democrats, but the violence at the Srisaket protest backfired on the PAD. The proposed amendments to the constitution is the next issue that NPP will try to use to create a wedge between the yellow shirts and the Democrats - there is of course Newin and other issues - but the tensions in the Democrats seem ripe for the NPP to make it an issue.

For now, BP still predicts an election in the 3rd quarter next year and now NPP are very unprepared to contest any kind of election and well their projected numbers should be considered as "projections". Actual member numbers is more relevant. There is a by-election tentatively scheduled to be held in Songkhla at the end of November (after the death of a Democrat MP). This may be a little early to test the NPP's electoral chances next year, but it will at least show where they are (if they contest of course). For now, they are a small party, but they do have a massive media arm and can very easily get their message across to potential NPP voters. BP sees them as relevant because they are likely to be key on whether the Democrats can win the next election.

Siam Report

Gen. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh’s (a.k.a. Big Jiew-บิ๊กจิ๋ว) recent decision to join Puea Thai brought a public response; call it a rebuke, from Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda (a.k.a. Pa-ป๋า). Speaking at the Army officer club, with six commanders from the military branches behind him, Prem said he had sent someone to tell Chavalit to think carefully about his decision to join Puea Thai; otherwise it could be a betrayal of the country (see BP post here). Prem insists that he and Chavalit are still friends, but the statement makes it quite clear that relations between these two old “friends” are not as solid as they used to be.

Matichon has published an article covering the “Pa-Jiew” saga, as well as other important political developments.

On the “Pa-Jiew” drama, Matichon says news from “Friends of Chavalit—FOC” camp is that the “owner of Si Sao Thewet—Prem” did not allow “Pau Yai—Chavalit” to meet him in order to bring flowers and cloth, asking forgiveness before ordaining as a monk on the 20th of May 2009, in Chiang Mai. The response from the Prem camp is that he had no idea that Chavalit had decided to ordain as a monk. However, there is news (likely from FOC) that Chavalit did contact Prem through Gen. Pachun Thamprateep, chief of the Office of Privy Council President. Matichon notes that Prem might still be irritated that Chavalit chose to return and help Thaksin during the Somachai Wongsuwat government.

โดยเฉพาะการปล่อยข่าวผ่านเครือข่าย "เอฟโอซี" (เฟรนด์ ออฟ ชวลิต) ว่า "เจ้าของบ้านสี่เสาเทเวศร์" ไม่ยอมให้ "พ่อใหญ่ลา" เข้าพบเพื่อนำพานพุ่มดอกไม้แพรไป ขออโหสิกรรม ก่อนเข้าอุปสมบทที่วัดพระธาตุศรีจอมทองวรวิหาร อ.จอมทอง จ.เชียงใหม่ เมื่อวันที่ 20 พฤศจิกายน 2551 ด้วยเพราะยังเคืองที่ "บิ๊กจิ๋ว" วกกลับไปช่วยงาน "นายใหญ่" ในยุครัฐบาล "สมชาย วงศ์สวัสดิ์"ตรงนี้ทำให้ "บุรุษผมขาว" ถูกมองว่าไม่เป็นผู้ใหญ่ร้อนถึงผู้ถูกวิจารณ์ต้องตั้งโพเดียมแก้ต่างเมื่อวันที่ 15 ตุลาคมที่ผ่านมา โดยระบุว่าไม่ เคยทราบว่า "บิ๊กจิ๋ว" จะไปบวชที่ไหน เมื่อไร โดยมี "นายทหารลูกป๋า" 6 คนคอยยืนให้ กำลังใจอยู่เบื้องหลัง อย่างไรก็ตาม มีข่าวว่า "พ่อใหญ่ลา" ได้ติดต่อขอขมา "ป๋า" จริง โดยประสานงานผ่าน "พล.ร.อ.พะจุณณ์ ตามประทีป" หัวหน้าสำนักงานประธาน องคมนตรีและรัฐบุรุษ

SR: It is easy to see how Prem would still be upset about Chavalit helping Thaksin—it is Thaksin’s red shirts after all that protested at Prem’s residence accusing him of masterminding the 2006 coup, and demanding he resign as Privy Council president. Chavalit is also a former Prem loyalist. Prem, indeed, has every right to call anyone out he wants, including Chavalit—as it’s clearly written into the-ir 2007 Constitution. However, in doing so, some outsiders say Prem has done a disservice to himself and “others” by directly participating in the dirty sport of political mud wrestling. The Council, according to this group, is a reflection of the institution, which doesn’t involve itself in politics.

So, Chavalit has ignored the warning and joined a legally registered political party, which perhaps ironically is called Puea Thai (for Thai). What possible conclusions are we to draw about this move and his decision to travel to Cambodia at the time of Prem’s statements—Chavalit went to Cambodia with close friend, Gen. Wichit Yathip, in order to meet with PM Hun Sen (certainly a lot of time was spent “plotting”). These are certainly not things a good Thai would do, right?

Also in the Matichon piece was coverage of retired Gen. Jiradet Kocharat’s decision to hop aboard the Puea Thai express. Here is a summarized translation of that portion.

Finally, “Big Jauk—บิ๊กจ๊อก” Gen. Jiradet Kotcharat (class 9), former deputy Army commander-in-chief, who just retired on the 30th of September, 2009—was living as a normal citizen, but not for long.

He has chosen an auspicious moment to start down the “political road”—fully affiliating with Puea Thai party, which has “Pau Yai Jiew” (Gen. Chavalit Yongchaiyut), former PM.

Previously, Gen. Jiradet remained up in the air on which party to join or whether to establish a new political party with a “group of friends”, especially those closely related to Somsak Thepsuthin, a former Thai Rak Thai executive.

But in the end, “Big Jauk” chose to join Puea Thai, which is the political party considered “enemy number one” by the military—always.

What prompted the high-ranking soldier, who was deputy commander-in-chief, and one part of the “military coup” on September 19, 2006—during which he held the position of deputy commander of army area 3—before rising to area 3 commander—replacing Saprang Kalayanamitr (Class 7—Saprang ended up as deputy secretary in the defense ministry).

One possibility is that Jiradet has close relations with “Pau Yai Jiew”, which has looked after all of Class 9 for a long time—especially leaders like “Big Bae-บิ๊กแป๊ะ”, Gen. Wichit Yathip—former deputy commander-in-chief and big brother in Class 9. [note above that Chavalit traveled to Cambodia with Wichit]

It also means that Gen. Jitadet is a close Class 9 mate of Wichit, making this decision “click”—not so difficult.

Since Wichit and Chavalit were invited to work with Puea Thai—it’s therefore not strange that Jiradet accepted—because he is linked with political circles in the north—“Thaksin era”

One reason is Jiradet looks at the political future—if he chooses “Pakmaetaranibeeppom” [code word for Democrats?], it could make it difficult to be big in politics. And a “close person” has mentioned that he doesn’t know what the Democrats are doing—even with the military [see comments] they cannot win an election, and in governing the country they don’t have anything good to offer the people.

These are probably the reasons that led Jiradet to stand on the side opposite of the military (“Pauk Era—ยุคน้องป๊อก”—Gen. Anupong Paochinda, commander-in-chief), going the path of politics indeed.

ในที่สุด "บิ๊กจ๊อก" พล.อ.จิรเดช คชรัตน์ อดีตรองผู้บัญชาการทหารบก ที่เพิ่งเกษียณอายุราชการไปหมาดๆ เมื่อวันที่ 30 กันยายน 2552 ผ่านการใช้ชีวิตแบบ "ประชาชนเต็มขั้น" ไปได้ไม่นานได้ฤกษ์เปิดตัวเข้าสู่ "ถนนสายการเมือง" แบบเต็มตัวด้วยการเข้าสังกัดพรรคเพื่อไทยที่มี "พ่อใหญ่จิ๋ว" พล.อ.ชวลิต ยงใจยุทธ อดีตนายกรัฐมนตรี เป็นหัวเรือกู้วิกฤตแม้ว่าเดิม พล.อ.จิรเดชจะยัง "ชั่งใจ" อยู่ว่าจะเข้าพรรคการเมืองใดดี หรือจะตั้ง พรรคการเมืองใหม่กับ "กลุ่มพ้องเพื่อน" โดยเฉพาะความสนิทชิดเชื้อ กับนายสมศักดิ์ เทพสุทิน อดีตกรรรมการบริหารพรรคไทยรักไทย ไม่น้อย แต่สุดท้าย "บิ๊กจ๊อก" ก็ตัดสินใจเลือกเข้าพรรคเพื่อไทย ซึ่งเป็นพรรคการเมืองที่ถือว่าเป็น "ศัตรูหมายเลขหนึ่ง" ของกองทัพมาตลอดด้วยเหตุผลใดที่ทำให้นายทหารระดับสูงที่เคยเป็นถึงรอง ผบ.ทบ. และเคยเป็นส่วนหนึ่ง ในการ "รัฐประหาร" เมื่อครั้ง 19 กันยายน 2549 ซึ่งสมัยเจ้าตัวเป็นรองแม่ทัพภาคที่ 3 ก่อนขึ้นเป็นแม่ทัพภาคที่ 3 ต่อจาก พล.อ.สพรั่ง กัลยาณมิตร อดีตรองปลัดกลาโหมทั้งนี้ คงเป็นด้วยส่วนหนึ่งที่ พล.อ.จิรเดชมีความสนิทใกล้ชิดกับ "พ่อใหญ่จิ๋ว" ที่ถือเป็น พ่อใหญ่ที่คอยดูแลบรรดานายทหารเตรียมรุ่น 9 (ตท.9) มานาน โดยเฉพาะแกนนำ ตท.9 อย่าง "บิ๊กแป๊ะ" พล.อ.วิชิต ยาทิพย์ อดีตรอง ผบ.ทบ. ที่ถือเป็นพี่ใหญ่ในพ้องเพื่อน ตท.9ด้วยความที่ พล.อ.จิรเดชก็เป็น ตท.9 เพื่อนสนิทของ พล.อ.วิชิตเช่นกัน ทำให้การตัดสินใจ ครั้งนี้ "มันคลิกกัน" ได้ไม่ยากนักเมื่อ "เพื่อนแป๊ะ" และ "พ่อใหญ่จิ๋ว" ชักชวนมารวมกันทำพรรคเพื่อไทย ดังนั้น ไม่แปลกที่ พล.อ.จิรเดชจะตอบรับ เพราะเจ้าตัวคลุกคลีอยู่ในวงการเมืองในภาคเหนือ "ยุคทักษิณ" ไม่น้อยเช่นกันเหตุผลหนึ่ง คือ พล.อ.จิรเดชมองอนาคตการเมือง หากเลือก "พรรคแม่ธรณีบีบมวยผม" คงยากที่จะเป็นใหญ่ทางการเมืองและเจ้าตัวเคยปรารภกับ "คนใกล้ชิด" ว่า "ไม่รู้ว่าพรรคประชาธิปัตย์เขาเป็นอย่างไร ขนาดทหารบีบคอให้ยังไม่ชนะเลือกตั้ง แล้วพอมาบริหาร ประเทศก็ไม่เห็นจะมีอะไร เข้าตาประชาชน"คงด้วยเหตุผลเหล่านี้ ทำให้ พล.อ.จิรเดชตัดสินใจขอยืนฝั่งตรงข้ามกองทัพ "ยุคน้องป๊อก" พล.อ.อนุพงษ์ เผ่าจินดา ผู้บัญชาการทหารบก มาเดินเส้นทางสายการเมืองอย่างแท้จริง

SR: In addition to two top former military commanders [Chavalit and Jiradet] joining Puea Thai, the Bangkok Post reports that 20 former Class 10 classmates of Thaksin have decided to join Puea Thai, including ACM Sumeth Phomanee, former chief of staff officers at the defense ministry, Lt-Gen Jirasit Kesakomol, former commander of the First Army Corp, and Lt-Gen Manas Paorik, former deputy commander of the Third Army Area. The report also notes Puea Thai party leader Yongyuth as saying that 49 other retired military and police have joined the party. At the time of Jiradet’s induction, former deputy army commander, Wichien Rattanapirapong, a former deputy permanent interior secretary , and Pol Maj-Gen Thawat Boonfueng, a former deputy chief of Provincial Police Region 8—both Class 10—signed on with Puea Thai, according to the Bangkok Post.

In a different piece from the Bangkok Post, Veera indicates that Gen. Manoon Roopkachorn and Gen. Panlop Pinmanee, former deputy chief of the Internal Security Operations Command, are scheduled to join Puea Thai as well. Manoonkrit is from the “Young Turks” clique, Class 7, and participated in two failed coup attempts against Prem in 1981 and 1985, while Panlop, also Class 7, is similarly well-versed in coups, crackdowns, and other “black-ops”—reported Thaksin assassination plot included.

Veera, unsurprisingly, is cynical of the move by Chavalit and the other generals to join Puea Thai. Cynicism aside, the decision of these generals to side with Puea Thai represents a threat to the present power holders, otherwise why would they go out of their way to vociferously speak against it. These generals may not hold “real power” (i.e. top command positions—control of the tanks and guns) but the moves they make are highly symbolic and one shouldn’t underestimate what influence they can bring to bear even though they are retired. It also confirms, once again, that the 2006 coup leaders have still not succeeded in accomplishing their goal of destroying Thaksin and his networks—Thaksin and Puea Thai now not only have strong support from the rural electorate but also from segments of the military past and present. Certainly not everyone is content with the current power configuration. A key feature of the Thai military, historically, is class factionalism, and it would come as no surprise if we are witnessing some of this at the moment—with some of it even occurring within one class, Class 10.

How this all plays out is obviously uncertain, but one has to consider what would happen if Puea Thai wins the next election and controls government. It seems possible that this could set the stage for a direct confrontation between the military cliques aligned with Puea Thai and those aligned with the current government. With Puea Thai at the helm, would they dare contemplate purging the top military leadership and moving their own men in (this is the usual process and one of the many reasons there is a cycle of political instability), and if they did, what would the counter-reaction be? Does the Anupong Era have staying power? What makes everything more intriguing is that the political landscape could have altered greatly by the time another election is held, which could change the way high-level power plays are conducted. Looking back at some history, in May 1986, Gen. Prem, serving as PM, ousted army commander-in-chief, Gen. Arthit Kamlang-ek (a.k.a. Big Sun) and replaced him with none other than Gen. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh!